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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of the far-right in shaping foreign-born immigrants’ satisfaction with the way
democracy works in their host country. It posits that while electorally successful far-right parties undermine
democracy satisfaction, the magnitude of this effect is not uniform across all first-generation immigrants. Instead, it
depends on newcomers’ citizenship status in their adopted homeland. The analyses using individual-level data collected
as part of the five-round European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2012 in 16 West European democracies reveal that the
electoral strength of far-right parties in a form of vote and seat shares won in national elections is indeed powerfully
linked to democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals. However, this relationship is limited to foreign-born
non-citizens, as we have no evidence that far-right parties influence democracy attitudes among foreign-born
individuals who have acquired citizenship in their adopted homeland.
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With the growing size and diversity of immigrant popula-
tions in western democracies, the political integration of
newcomers into their host societies has become of central
importance to many academic and policy debates (e.g.
Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009; Joppke, 2007a, 2007b;
Wright and Bloemraad, 2012). One key concern has been
whether immigrants are sufficiently committed to demo-
cratic governance, whether they evaluate political systems
in countries that receive them in the same way as native
populations, and whether granting immigrants citizenship
(or failing to do so) may affect the stability and quality of
democratic life. These questions have become increasingly
more salient over time, turning immigration into the most
polarizing issue of electoral politics in Western Europe
since the 1990s (Kriesi et al., 2008; see also Alonso and
Claro da Fonseca, 2012).
This study seeks to contribute to existing debates on
immigration by focusing on democracy satisfaction among
foreign-born individuals in Western Europe.1 Low levels of
system support have been long assumed to pose grave
problems for democracies (Hetherington, 1998; Lipset,
1959; Powell, 1982, 1986; see also Dalton, 2004; Pharr
and Putnam, 2000), encouraging researchers to devote
considerable attention to how people come to form their
political legitimacy beliefs. These opinions have been
shown to be influenced by what political systems are and
do – their institutions, processes, and performance – but
also people’s expectations about how these should func-
tion. Specifically, scholars found that people express more
favorable views about the political systems that generate
more positive outcomes (economic, political, and the
like), and that do so more fairly (Tyler, 1990). Individual
expectations matter as well, as democracy satisfaction can
be lower among individuals who want more democracy,
not less (e.g. Norris, 1999, 2011).
While much is known about legitimacy beliefs of native
populations, systematic research on such attitudes among
immigrants remains limited. This is surprising given that
many newcomers, particularly in recent decades, arrive from
countries with little democratic experience. Moreover,
Paper submitted 5 October 2014; accepted for publication 12 August
2015
Corresponding author:
Aida Just, Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey.
Email: aidap@bilkent.edu.tr
Party Politics
2017, Vol. 23(5) 507–525





foreigners are often said to have dual allegiances to origin
and destination countries, potentially diluting their commit-
ment to their new homeland and its democratic governance.
Existing research has acknowledged that standard explana-
tions are helpful but insufficient in explaining immigrants’
political preferences as well as understanding how and why
they choose to engage in politics (e.g. Cho et al., 2006;
Ramakrishnan, 2005). Since foreigners were socialized in
political systems that differ from the ones they subsequently
inhabit, possess varied rights and entitlements depending on
their legal status, and are exposed to different socio-cultural,
political, and economic environments in their host countries,
explaining immigrants’ attitudes and behavior requires
accounting for these experiences.
Below, we develop a model of immigrants’ satisfaction
with the way democracy works in their host country that
takes into consideration such immigrant-specific experi-
ences, while controlling for traditional predictors of system
support. Our model highlights the importance of far-right
parties and immigrants’ political incorporation into their
host country via citizenship. Specifically, we posit that
far-right parties contribute negatively to democracy satis-
faction among foreign-born individuals. However, the
magnitude of this relationship depends on whether a
foreign-born individual has acquired citizenship in one’s
adopted homeland or not. The analyses using individual-
level data collected as part of the five-round European
Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2012 in 16 West European
democracies confirm these expectations. We find that the
strength of far-right parties – whether measured in terms
of vote or seat shares won in national elections – is powerfully
linked to democracy satisfaction among first-generation
immigrants. However, this relationship is limited to newco-
mers who have not been naturalized in their host country,
as the results reveal no evidence of such a relationship
among foreign-born individuals who hold citizenship of
their adopted homeland.
This study contributes to existing research in several
ways. First, given that the quality and stability of demo-
cratic life in Europe increasingly depends on foreigners,
whose numbers have grown significantly over the last few
decades, our analysis adds to previous studies by focusing
on democracy satisfaction of foreign-born individuals
rather than natives, and by systematically analyzing the
determinants of these attitudes. Second, our model high-
lights the critical, but complex, role that far-right parties
play in shaping these attitudes. In doing so, we extend scho-
larship on the far-right by considering its electoral success
as a key independent rather than dependent variable, and
contribute to an expanding body of scholarship on the con-
sequences of the far-right for West European politics.2
Third, our study adds to research on citizenship by testing
whether formal membership in a polity continues to exert
an impact on people’s political views in contemporary
democracies where differences in legal rights between
citizens and non-citizens have been significantly reduced
in recent decades (Hollifield, 1992; Jacobson, 1996; Soy-
sal, 1994). Finally, we contribute to a growing set of sys-
tematic cross-national studies on immigrants’ political
attitudes and behavior that test arguments using a wide
range of countries with diverse immigrant populations.
The far-right, threat perceptions, and
immigrants’ legitimacy beliefs
It has long been known that people’s political attitudes and
behavior are affected by their perceptions of what others
think or do (e.g. Cooley, 1956; Mutz, 1998). Individuals
constantly (and to a large extent unconsciously) scan their
environment to assess which opinions might become
favored by the majority and which ones might lead to social
isolation (e.g. Scheufele and Moy, 2000). Moreover, those
belonging to subordinate or less powerful groups have been
found to be particularly attuned to their surroundings, pay-
ing attention to shifts even in the affective and nonverbal
tone of dominant group members (Frable, 1997; Hall and
Briton, 1993; Oyserman and Swim, 2001). Since immi-
grants commonly perceive themselves to be in an inferior
position due to their outsider status in their host societies,
they should be highly sensitive to their socio-political envi-
ronment, especially with respect to natives’ actions that
have direct consequences for newcomers in their adopted
homeland.
We argue that an important aspect of this socio-political
context is the strength of far-right parties in national elec-
tions. Far-right parties in Western Europe have often
sought political power by campaigning explicitly (although
not always exclusively) on the basis of anti-immigrant
appeals (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Joppke, 2007a; Messina, 2007;
Mudde, 2007; Zaslove, 2004). They usually reject immi-
gration as an invasion of foreign customs and traditions that
weaken natives’ cultural identity, and also as a threat to
national security, employment, and social welfare. And
although far-right parties are not single-issue parties (e.g.
Carter, 2005; Gibson, 2002; Mudde, 2000), opposition
towards immigration has been found to be the only issue
that unites all successful far-right parties in Western Eur-
ope (Ivarsflaten, 2008).3 Moreover, some scholars argue
that far-right parties have played an important role in
adopting stricter immigration and immigrant integration
policies, particularly with respect to migrants’ naturaliza-
tion and cultural rights, although the precise mechanism via
which they have done so remains a matter of debate
(Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012; Koopmans et al.,
2012: 1234; Schain, 2006; Zaslove, 2004; but see Akker-
man, 2012; Bale, 2008).
Given the focus of far-right parties on anti-immigrant
policies in established democracies, it should not be sur-
prising that foreign-born individuals in these countries
view far-right parties as an important source of threat. A
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number of studies demonstrate that perceptions of threat
among immigrants have consequences for their political
behavior. They show, for example, that anti-immigrant leg-
islation in the US in the mid-1990s, which sought to restrict
immigrants’ access to welfare benefits, increased voting
turnout among first- and second-generation immigrants
(Pantoja et al., 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2005, especially
Chapter 6; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). Simi-
larly, perceptions of threat associated with the Patriot Act
legislation and incidents of racially motivated discrimina-
tion and violence resulted in higher voter registration
among more educated Arab immigrants (Cho et al.,
2006). Moreover, research shows that immigrants mobi-
lized politically and rallied fiercely for their enfranchise-
ment in response to growing electoral strength of the
far-right in Belgium (Jacobs, 1999). Taken together, these
studies suggest that perceptions of threat among immi-
grants contribute positively to their political engagement,
and that immigrants’ dissatisfaction with the political status
quo and the desire to change it fuel this relationship.
If immigrants indeed respond to perceived threat to their
rights and freedoms by adopting more negative views about
the political status quo in their host society, then the
strength of anti-immigrant far-right parties in national elec-
tions should play a considerable role in shaping their satis-
faction with the functioning of democracy. Since policies
related to immigrant admission and integration continue
to be decided largely at the level of nation-states (as
opposed to sub-national regions or the EU),4 it should not
be surprising that newcomers may see the success of far-
right parties in national elections as a source of concern that
their rights and freedoms will be restricted in the newly
elected parliament.5 Moreover, high shares of votes/seats
secured by far-right parties may result in further mobiliza-
tion of anti-immigrant sentiment among natives. This is
because, according to the spiral of silence theory (Noelle-
Neumann, 1974, 1993), those who hold unpopular (in this
case, xenophobic) views but were previously afraid to
express them may become more vocal, as they realize that
they are no longer part of a small minority and have gained
access to important policy making institutions. Hence, the
success of far-right parties represents a double threat to
immigrants: it may lead not only to more restrictive immi-
gration and immigrant integration policies in the short run,
but also to a more hostile socio-political environment
towards immigrants in the long run.
In short, by making immigrants feel more threatened
and unwanted in their host society, the electoral success
of far-right parties should motivate foreign-born individu-
als to adopt more negative opinions about the political sta-
tus quo in their host country. Conversely, where far-right
parties receive few votes and seats in national elections,
and therefore remain weak or absent from the electoral
arena and policy-making institutions, immigrants should
be more likely to see themselves as part of their host society
and having a stake in its political system. As a conse-
quence, foreign-born individuals in countries where far-
right parties fare poorly at the voting booth should express
more positive opinions about the functioning of democratic
governance in their adopted homeland. Hence, we hypothe-
size that higher vote or seat shares received by the far-right
in national elections should result in lower levels of democ-
racy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals (Hypoth-
esis 1).
Contingent effects of the far-right:
The role of citizenship
In addition to understanding the effect of the far-right on
first-generation immigrants’ legitimacy beliefs, we are
interested in whether this impact is uniform across all
foreign-born individuals. Specifically, we ask whether for-
mally incorporating newcomers into the polity of their host
country influences how immigrants respond to the electoral
success of far-right parties when forming their opinions
about their host country’s democratic governance. We
argue that citizenship moderates the relationship between
far-right vote/seat shares and support for the political sys-
tem among foreign-born individuals: specifically, while
the fortunes of the far-right in national elections can be
expected to reduce democracy satisfaction among all
first-generation immigrants, this negative relationship
should be weaker (or insignificant) among newcomers who
have acquired citizenship in their adopted homeland.
We base these expectations on several insights from
previous research. By formally distinguishing between
insiders and outsiders, citizenship is known to have an
instrumental and symbolic value to individuals who hold
it (Bauböck, 2007; Bloemraad et al., 2008). Instrumentally,
it provides people with formal protections and material
benefits (e.g. the right to vote in national elections, wider
employment opportunities and welfare benefits, visa-free
travel, and protection against deportation), while symboli-
cally citizenship is usually seen as an expression of kinship
or psychological attachment to a country. Both aspects of
citizenship lead us to expect that the far-right should exert
a stronger impact on legitimacy beliefs among foreign-born
non-citizens than among foreign-born citizens. To put it
simply, because citizenship provides important rights, pro-
tections, and entitlements, the electoral performance of the
far-right should appear less consequential to the situation of
immigrants who have naturalized in their country of resi-
dence. In contrast, individuals without citizenship are more
likely to feel personally threatened by powerful far-right
parties. Hence, instrumental considerations associated with
citizenship should alleviate threat perceptions among
immigrants, and consequently weaken the impact that the
electoral fortunes of the far-right may have for newcomers’
democracy satisfaction in their country of residence.
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Citizenship status is important also in several other
ways. Without the legal right to vote in national elections,
non-citizen immigrants cannot counteract the far-right by
voting for other parties or casting blank votes. Nor can they
expect support from or be defended by other parties, as pol-
iticians seeking public office at the national level rarely
have incentives to appeal to individuals who do not have
the right to vote. Hence, a sense of threat along with disen-
franchisement in the presence of strong far-right parties
should encourage foreign-born individuals to adopt more
negative attitudes towards the functioning of the political
system in their host country if they are non-citizens.
Finally, citizenship may moderate the relationship
between the electoral strength of the far-right and democ-
racy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals also for
symbolic reasons. From this perspective, citizenship
acquisition is an expression of kinship or psychological
attachment to one’s adopted homeland that encourages
immigrants to consider their new country as their own.6
Previous studies reveal that citizenship motivates foreign-
ers to pay more attention to the realities of their adopted
country when forming attitudes towards policy issues and
political institutions (e.g. Just and Anderson, 2015; Röder
and Mühlau, 2011). This research shows, for example,
that foreigners who have acquired citizenship of their
host country are less likely to support immigration than
foreign-born non-citizens, particularly when they are dis-
satisfied with the macro-economy in their host country.
Such socio-tropic orientations along with weaker support
for immigration among foreign-born citizens may encour-
age foreign-born individuals who have acquired citizen-
ship in their host country to see the success of the
far-right in a less negative light compared to those who
have not been naturalized.
Taken together, these studies suggest that citizenship
should weaken the negative effect of the far-right on
democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals.
At the same time, however, there are reasons to suspect that
citizenship may not completely eliminate this effect. This is
because first-generation immigrants often hold dual alle-
giances (e.g. Just and Anderson, 2015; Pérez, 2014; Simon
et al., 2015), that is, an attachment to their host country but
also a continued identification with other immigrants or
co-ethnics who, like themselves, have gone through the
experience of migrating and settling in a new country. As
a consequence, they know that migration can be a difficult
process of physical and psychological uprooting and relo-
cation, which often requires considerable efforts in adjust-
ing to a new environment as well as learning how to cope
with the consequences of being an outsider and being dif-
ferent in one’s adopted homeland.7 Hence, kinship and sol-
idarity with other migrants may encourage foreign-born
individuals to react to the far-right electoral fortunes even
when the host country’s citizenship shields them from the
reach of anti-immigrant far-right policies.
In short, we expect that the electoral strength of the far-
right interacts with citizenship in shaping immigrants’
legitimacy beliefs. Specifically, while the success of the
far-right at the voting booth is likely to be negatively linked
to democracy satisfaction among all foreign-born indivi-
duals, this negative relationship should be particularly
pronounced among those who are non-citizens. If our
expectations are correct, the analyses should reveal nega-
tive and statistically significant coefficients of national
vote/seat shares of far-right parties, but a positive (and sta-
tistically significant) coefficient of the interaction between
citizenship and far-right party strength in shaping immi-
grants’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their
host country. Hence, our second hypothesis is that the neg-
ative effect of vote/seat shares received by far-right parties
in national elections should be less pronounced (or insignif-
icant) among foreign-born individuals who hold citizenship
of their host country (Hypothesis 2).
Data and analysis
We test our expectations using individual-level data col-
lected as part of the five-wave European Social Survey
(ESS) 2002–2012. Widely recognized for its high meth-
odological standards in cross-national survey design and
data collection (Kittilson, 2009),8 this project is the only
set of cross-national surveys that ask questions related to
people’s citizenship, foreign-born status, origin country,
and duration of stay in the host country, alongside the
standard question whether respondents are satisfied with
the way democracy works in their country of residence.
The relevant survey items and macro-level indicators
were available for 16 established democracies in Western
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
Dependent variable
To capture individuals’ support for the political system,
we rely on a commonly used measure of democracy satis-
faction. The relevant survey item asked respondents: ‘‘On
the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy
works in [country]?’’ Responses were coded on a scale
from 0 to 10, with higher values denoting more satisfac-
tion.9 While not without critics, it is generally acknowl-
edged as an indicator of people’s evaluations of regime
performance rather than democracy as an ideal (Anderson
et al., 2005: 41; Fuchs et al., 1995: 328; Klingemann,
1999; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Norris, 1999), and cap-
tures people’s support for the political system at a low
level of generalization (Anderson and Guillory, 1997;
Fuchs et al., 1995: 330).
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Independent variables
To identify foreign-born respondents and to distinguish
between citizens and noncitizens among them, we relied
on two ESS questions ‘‘Were you born in [country]’’? and
‘‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’’ Both are dichotomous,
with 1 indicating a positive response, and zero a negative
one. Pooling the data across countries generates a sample
of 11,548 foreign-born respondents (7.90% of all surveyed
individuals);10 of these, 48.73% are citizens and 51.27%
are non-citizens.11
To test whether far-right parties reduce democracy satis-
faction among foreign-born individuals, and whether citi-
zenship plays a role in moderating this relationship, we
rely on McLaren’s (2012) classification of far-right parties
with anti-immigrant orientation. McLaren selected parties
that expressed opposition to immigration as one of their
main policy positions in national elections preceding the
fielding of the ESS questionnaire (McLaren, 2012:
235).12 To verify whether far-right parties on our list are
indeed more anti-immigrant than other parties, we used
Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert surveys on party place-
ment with respect to the issue of immigration.13 Specifi-
cally, experts were asked to place political parties in their
country on a scale from 1 to 20, where 1 indicates that a
party favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and
immigrants to integrate into [country’s] society, and 20
shows that a party favours policies designed to help asylum
seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin.
This means that higher values on this variable denote more
hostility towards immigration. The salience variable also
ranges from 1 to 20, with higher values indicating that an
issue is more salient to a party.
Table 1 reports the mean values of party placement with
respect to both salience and position on immigration among
our far-right parties in comparison to other parties. It
reveals that far-right parties are consistently more anti-
immigrant than other parties, and this is true for all coun-
tries in our sample.14 The average score of far-right party
position (on a scale from 1 to 20) on immigration is
19.10, whereas the respective mean for all other parties is
9.07 – a difference of more than 10 points. The results with
respect to issue salience indicate that while other parties are
not indifferent to immigration, the issue is clearly more
salient to far-right parties than it is to other parties: the
mean scores are 18.86 and 13.44, respectively. Taken
together, the results confirm that far-right parties included
in our analyses are indeed more hostile towards immigrants
and care about immigration more than other parties.
We employ two measures to capture far-right parties’
electoral strength: their vote and seat shares in national
elections prior to a respondent’s ESS interview. Far-right
vote shares in our sample of countries range from 0%
(e.g. Spain) to 29.4% (Switzerland), with the mean value
of 5.48%. Seat shares similarly range from 0% in several
countries (e.g. UK, Germany, and Ireland) to 31% in Swit-
zerland, with the mean value of 4.48%. (For more detailed
information on these variables, see the Appendix).
Control variables
Our empirical estimations include a number of control vari-
ables previously shown to be important determinants of
political system support. At the micro-level, we take into
account whether a respondent feels close to a party in gov-
ernment, as those who endorsed ruling parties have been
found to be more satisfied with democracy (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997; Anderson et al., 2005; Ginsberg and Weiss-
berg, 1978; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Norris, 1999). More-
over, since left-wing views and more extreme ideological
positions are generally linked to more openness to change
and more critical opinions about the political system
(Anderson and Singer, 2008; Anderson et al., 2005: Ch.
5; Riker, 1982), our models take into account the respon-
dent’s left-right self-placement and its distance from his
or her country’s left-right median in each survey round.
To identify individuals with greater incentives to main-
tain the socio-political status quo, we use standard demo-
graphic variables (age, gender, marital status), indicators
of people’s socio-economic status (income, education, and
manual skills) (Almond and Verba, 1963; Anderson et al.,
2005: 20), and perceptions of discrimination against one’s
group (Michelson, 2001, 2003; Röder and Mühlau, 2011).
Moreover, since better economic performance tends to
strengthen system legitimacy (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005:
148; Clarke et al., 1993), our empirical estimations include
respondents’ evaluations of the macro-economy in their
host country.
Beside standard predictors of legitimacy beliefs, we
control for immigrant-specific experiences in both sending
and receiving countries. To capture political socialization
before migration, we include a polity score of immigrants’
countries of origin at the time of arrival. We expect that
immigrants from less democratic countries are more satis-
fied with democracy in their adopted homeland because
they are more likely to appreciate political freedoms and
opportunities to influence politics that they did not have
in their home country. Moreover, since socialization in less
democratic regimes means less familiarity with democratic
governance (Ramakrishnan, 2005: 91; White et al., 2008),
and thus lower expectations from the political system of
their host country (Maxwell, 2010; Röder and Mühlau,
2011, 2012), immigrants from such regimes may have less
critical attitudes of the way democracy works than foreign-
ers from more democratic countries. Similarly, more recent
arrivals can be expected to be more satisfied with the polit-
ical system than foreigners who arrived to their destination
a long time ago (Maxwell, 2010; Röder and Mühlau, 2011,
2012). Finally, since a respondent’s ability to follow the
host country’s politics is enhanced by linguistic skills, we
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control for whether a respondent speaks the host country’s
official language at home.
Another potentially relevant aspect of a foreigner’s
background is whether one is a third-country national or
a citizen of another European Union country. Given that the
EU member states operate within the multi-level structure
of political institutions, foreign-born individuals who are
nationals of other EU countries may not only be more
familiar with the political processes in their host countries,
but also enjoy more extensive political rights and socio-
economic entitlements than third-country nationals (Koop-
mans et al., 2012: 1209). While these rights and entitlements
should generally enhance democracy satisfaction, familiarity
with political processes and higher expectations may encour-
age foreign-born EU citizens to adopt more critical opinions
of the political systems in their countries of residence com-
pared to third-country nationals. Our models therefore con-
trol for this variable, although its overall effect is not easy
to predict.
To capture policy environment designed to integrate
immigrants in their host society at the macro-level, we rely
on two measures: Banting and Kymlicka’s (2006) index of
immigrant multiculturalism policies and an indicator of
immigrants’ political participation rights from the Migrant
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) database (Niessen et al.,
2007). Furthermore, since immigrants have been found to
be sensitive to sub-national opinion climates of natives
(e.g. Maxwell, 2013), we include measures of regional
satisfaction with democracy among natives15 and regional
opinion climate towards immigrants among natives.
Finally, because our analyses are based on the cumulative
five-round survey data, we include dummy variables for
ESS rounds, using the first round as the reference category
for other rounds. (Details on survey questions and coding
for all measures are reported in the Appendix).
Analysis and results
Our model of democracy satisfaction among foreign-born
immigrants combines information collected at the level of
countries and individuals. This means that our dataset has
a multi-level structure that may present a number of statis-
tical problems, including non-constant variance, clustering,
and incorrect standard errors (e.g. Snijders and Bosker,
1999; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). The empirical estima-
tions presented below therefore rely on multi-level models
where one unit of analysis (foreign-born individuals) is
nested within another unit of analysis (country-rounds).16
The mixed-effects multi-level models include random
intercepts for both immigrants’ host and origin countries
(to allow for cross-country variability in democracy satis-
faction levels),17 and random slopes for the citizenship
variable (to allow for cross-country variability in the mag-
nitude of citizenship coefficient).
The results reported in Table 2 reveal that there is indeed
a negative and statistically significant relationship between
far-right party strength in national legislative elections and
democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals.
Hence, in line with our expectations, the electoral fortunes
of the far-right in a form of vote or seat shares are nega-
tively linked to immigrants’ support for the political system
in their host country. However, the results of our interaction
Table1. Salience and position on immigration among far-right parties compared to other parties in 16 West European democracies.
Country
Far-right Parties Other Parties
Position on immigration Salience of immigration Position on immigration Salience of immigration
Austria 18.50 18.00 8.75 14.35
Belgium 19.52 19.49 9.74 14.79
Denmark 19.34 19.40 10.57 15.87
Finland 18.84 18.26 8.67 11.47
France 19.26 19.17 10.19 13.53
Germany 19.23 18.92 12.06 15.55
Greece – – 8.97 13.49
Ireland – – 10.46 11.44
Italy 17.63 17.73 8.88 14.15
The Netherlands 18.32 18.75 9.65 13.35
Norway 19.09 18.52 7.16 12.47
Portugal – – 7.65 14.38
Spain – – 10.58 13.55
Sweden – – 7.06 12.30
Switzerland 19.24 18.92 10.99 13.98
UK – – 9.05 11.73
Average 19.10 18.86 9.07 13.44
Source: Calculations based on Benoit and Laver (2006) data.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































models indicate that the consequences of the far-right
should not be considered in isolation. Specifically, while
the additive term of far-right party strength remains nega-
tive and statistically significant, the interaction between
this variable and citizenship is positive and highly statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that while the presence of
electorally strong far-right parties is associated with lower
levels of democracy satisfaction among foreign-born indi-
viduals, this negative relationship is less pronounced
among those who have citizenship in their country of
residence.
One shortcoming of the ESS data is that while it allows
us to identify respondents’ citizenship and nativity status, it
does not tell us how foreigners who report having citizen-
ship in their host country have acquired it. This means that
we cannot clearly distinguish between foreign-born indi-
viduals who became citizens through naturalization and
those who were born abroad but acquired citizenship in
other ways (for example, inherited it from one of their par-
ents). Hence, we were interested in whether the results
remain the same when estimating the analyses against a
reduced sample of foreign-born individuals whose both
parents are foreign-born – that is, individuals who were
more likely to acquire citizenship through naturalization.18
The results reported in Table 2 (right side) reveal that our
findings remain essentially unchanged: we still find that the
strength of far-right parties in national elections is associ-
ated with less sanguine evaluations of regime performance
among foreign-born individuals, but this negative effect is
considerably weaker among those who hold citizenship of
their host country.19
The results with respect to control variables reveal that
democracy satisfaction among first-generation immigrants
is shaped by many factors found to be important determi-
nants of legitimacy beliefs among natives. Specifically,
identification with the ruling party, right-wing orientations,
and more optimistic evaluations of the macro-economy con-
tribute positively to democracy satisfaction, while feeling
discriminated against has the opposite effect. Moreover,
male and married respondents are more satisfied with
democracy than women and unmarried individuals, while
extreme ideological views, education, income, manual skills,
and age have no detectable consequences for political sys-
tem support among first-generation immigrants.20
With respect to immigrant-specific experiences, the
results show that foreigners who arrived more recently are
satisfied with democracy more than those who settled in
their host country a long time ago. Interestingly, foreigners
who are citizens of other EU countries are no different from
third-country nationals.21 However, political socialization
in one’s country of origin does leave a mark, as newcomers
from more democratic regimes are significantly more crit-
ical of the political system in their country of residence than
foreigners with little exposure to democratic governance
prior to migration. With respect to immigrants’ experiences
in their host countries, our results reveal no evidence that
multiculturalism policies are related to immigrants’ democ-
racy satisfaction.22 However, the extent to which immi-
grants enjoy comparable opportunities as nationals to
participate in their host country’s political life does matter:
we find that having more rights to engage politically is
associated with more critical opinions about the functioning
of the political system.23 Finally, democracy satisfaction
among natives is positively and statistically significantly
related to democracy satisfaction, suggesting that foreign-
born individuals are sensitive to what natives think about the
political system in their country. However, opinion climates
towards immigrants among natives are statistically insignif-
icant in all our models, highlighting the importance of elec-
toral rather than social context in shaping democracy
satisfaction among foreign-born individuals.24
How much do our key variables matter in substantive
terms? Figure 1 presents the predicted values of democracy
satisfaction at the maximum and minimum values of vote
shares received by far-right parties in our sample of coun-
tries (using the results from the interaction model of
foreign-born individuals with at least one foreign-born par-
ent in Table 2).25 The white bars indicate system support
among foreign-born non-citizens and the gray bars among
foreign-born citizens, while vertical lines denote the 95%
confidence intervals.
The figure reveals that far-right party strength in
national legislative elections indeed plays an important role
in shaping democracy satisfaction among foreign-born
individuals. Specifically, the score of democracy satisfac-
tion is reduced by 0.52 points (from 6.475 to 5.953 on a
scale from 0 to 10) when we compare foreign-born non-
citizens in a country with no electorally viable far-right
party (0% votes) to a country where the far-right enjoys the
highest level of electoral support in our sample of countries
– 29.4% of the national vote (the Swiss People’s Party in
the 2007 Swiss national elections). In contrast, this gap is
considerably smaller for foreign-born citizens: while the
predicted value of democracy satisfaction for a foreign-
born citizen living in a country with electorally weak far-
right parties is 6.229, the score for a similar individual in
a country with strong far-right parties is 6.198 – a differ-
ence of only 0.03 (and statistically insignificant).26 Taken
together, the results confirm that national electoral support
for far-right parties is indeed linked to lower levels of
democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals,
but this relationship is limited to foreign-born non-citizens.
To further assess the substantive and statistical signifi-
cance of our main variables, Figure 2 reports the marginal
effects of vote shares received by the far-right on democ-
racy satisfaction among foreign-born citizens and foreign-
born non-citizens (with 95% confidence intervals). In line
with our expectations, the marginal effect of far-right vote
shares for non-citizens is negative and statistically distin-
guishable from 0, while the marginal effect for foreign-
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born citizens is both substantively and statistically insignif-
icant. Specifically, the results reveal that one percent
change in vote share of far-right parties is associated with
a 0.017 decrease in democracy satisfaction score for a
foreign-born non-citizen.27
The magnitude of the relationship between the far-right
electoral strength and democracy satisfaction among
foreign-born non-citizens exceeds the effects of some tradi-
tional political predictors of peoples’ legitimacy beliefs,
such as winning an election or holding right-wing ideologi-
cal views. For instance, if we compare the scores of democ-
racy satisfaction of respondents who feel close to a party in
government and those who do not, the difference is 0.46
(in comparison to 0.52 point difference when we compare
foreign-born non-citizens in countries with 0% and 29%
vote share for the far-right). Similarly, moving from 0 to
10 on the left-right self-placement scale (where 0 indicates
extreme left and 10 denotes extreme right) increases the
score of democracy satisfaction by 0.47 – a change that is
smaller than the above mentioned far-right effect. In short,
the results of our analyses confirm that the extent to which
far-right parties succeed in gaining votes and seats in
national legislative elections is indeed strongly linked to
first-generation immigrants’ satisfaction with the way
democracy works in their host country, but this relationship
is limited to those among them who do not hold their host
country’s citizenship.
Discussion
The prospects of democratic legitimacy in Europe will
increasingly depend on the attitudes and behavior of immi-
grants whose shares in contemporary democracies have
been on the rise and are expected to grow in the future
(e.g. de Haas, 2007). To better understand how immigrants
form opinions about the political system in their adopted
homeland, this study focused on foreign-born individuals
in Western Europe and sought to answer several important
but previously unanswered questions: do far-right parties
play a role in shaping newcomers’ satisfaction with the way
democracy works in their host country? If so, are all
foreign-born individuals equally affected by the electoral
fortunes of far-right parties, or are some immigrants more
sensitive to the far-right than other immigrants?
This paper argues that a comprehensive explanation of
democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals
requires taking into account not only traditional predictors
of people’s attitudes towards the political system, but also
immigrant-specific experiences. Among these, we high-
light the importance of citizenship status and far-right
strength in national legislative elections of immigrant’s
receiving country. Our analysis reveals that the far-right
vote/seat shares secured in these elections are indeed
powerfully linked to democracy satisfaction among
foreign-born individuals, but only among those who have
not acquired citizenship of their adopted homeland.28 Inter-
estingly, this relationship is stronger than the substantive
impact of some traditional predictors of people’s legiti-
macy beliefs, such as feeling close to a party in government
or holding right-wing views. Hence, the results confirm that
foreign-born non-citizens are sensitive to their host coun-
try’s political context when expressing their satisfaction
with the way democracy works. However, the results also
show that what foreign-born non-citizens pay attention to
is the electoral success of the far-right, not opinion climates
towards immigrants more generally, as we find no statisti-
cally significant results with respect to anti-immigrant
attitudes among natives.
Taken together, these findings challenge the conclusions
of recent scholarship that far-right parties have a limited

























Figure1. Predicted effects of citizenship and far-right vote shares
on satisfaction with democracy among foreign-born individuals,
2002–2012.
































Figure2. Marginal effect of citizenship and far-right vote shares
on satisfaction with democracy among foreign-born individuals,
2002–2012.
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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no previous studies have examined the effects of the far-
right in shaping democracy satisfaction among foreign-
born individuals. Moreover, our findings have important
implications for current debates on the political conse-
quences of citizenship. We find that, in spite of diminishing
differences between citizens and non-citizens in many con-
temporary democracies that now provide various legal,
socio-economic, and political rights to all individuals with
legal residence in their host countries (Hollifield, 1992;
Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994), citizenship remains an
important marker of immigrants’ legitimacy beliefs. We
posit, although cannot test directly, that citizenship moder-
ates the negative effect of the far-right on democracy satis-
faction among foreign-born individuals for a number of
reasons. Instrumentally, citizenship shields immigrants
from the negative consequences of the policies of the far-
right by giving newcomers formal rights and protections
that alleviate immigrants’ threat perceptions. Furthermore,
formal membership in a host society enhances immigrants’
sense of political empowerment by providing them with a
legal right to vote in national elections. Symbolically, citi-
zenship strengthens immigrants’ psychological attachment
to their host country, lowering their support for further
migration and weakening their opposition to far-right poli-
cies. As a consequence, while the electoral fortunes of
far-right parties are powerfully linked to democracy satisfac-
tion among foreign-born non-citizens, they do not signifi-
cantly alter legitimacy beliefs of foreign-born individuals
who have acquired citizenship in their host country.
These findings are important because electoral support
for the far-right appears to be firmly rooted in European
societies with a prospect to grow and enable far-right par-
ties to become government coalition partners in the years
to come (Mudde, 2013: 15–16). This suggests that favor-
able conditions for developing immigrants’ support for
democratic governance in contemporary democracies
might become even harder to come by. Existing research
shows that foreign-born individuals arrive with highly pos-
itive opinions about their host countries, but this optimism
tends to weaken with more exposure to their adopted home-
lands (Maxwell, 2010; Röder and Mühlau, 2011, 2012).
Our findings suggest that the rise of the far-right in many
established democracies may be in part responsible for this
decline, and future research could illuminate in more detail
how immigrants respond to the far-right over time (and
across immigrant generations). Moreover, while our study
focused on the electoral strength of far-right parties at the
national level, focusing on their electoral fortunes on
the regional level may provide additional insights into how
the far-right shapes immigrants’ political attitudes and beha-
vior. In the meantime, we conclude that while governments
of immigrant receiving countries have little influence over
immigrants’ exposure to democratic governance in their
countries of origin, they are not completely powerless in
shaping the prospects of democratic legitimacy within their
country borders: educating the general public about the dan-
gers of the far-right rather than adopting their strategies in




Satisfaction with democracy (dependent variable).
‘‘On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way
democracy works in [country]?’’ 0 ‘extremely dis-
satisfied’, 10 ‘extremely satisfied’.
Foreign-born immigrant. ‘‘Were you born in [coun-
try]?’’ 0 ‘yes’, 1 ‘no’. Foreign-born respondents
with both native-born parents were excluded from
the analyses.
Far-right party strength. Two indicators: % of votes
and % of seats received by far-right parties in
national legislative elections. See the table below
for detailed information on far-right parties by
country and survey round.
Citizen. ‘‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’’ 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.
Feeling close to government party. Based on two
survey questions: ‘‘Is there a particular political
party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’’
If the answer was ‘yes’, then a respondent was
presented with a follow up question: ‘‘Which
one?’’ Individual responses to these questions
were then matched with information from the
European Journal of Political Research on gov-
ernment composition at the time of the survey
to create a dichotomous variable, where 1 indi-
cates that a respondent feels close to a party in
government, and 0 otherwise.
Left-Right self-placement. ‘‘In politics people some-
times talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card,
where would you place yourself on this scale,
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’’
Left-Right extremism. Absolute distance between
respondent’s left-right self-placement and country
median (calculated for each survey round); ranges
from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating more
extreme positions.
Economic evaluations. ‘‘On the whole, how satisfied
are you with the present state of the economy
in [country]?’’ 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’, 10
‘extremely satisfied’.
Discriminated against. ‘‘Would you describe yourself
as being a member of a group that is discriminated
against in this country?’’ 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.
Recent arrival. ‘‘How long ago did you first come to
live in [country]?’’ 5 ‘within last year’, 4 ‘1-5 years
ago’, 3 ‘6–10 years ago’, 2 ‘11–20 years ago’, 1
‘more than 20 years ago’.
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Democracy in origin country. Based on survey ques-
tions: ‘‘Were you born in [country]?’’ If a respon-
dent said ‘‘no’’, then the follow up question was
‘‘In which country were you born?’’ and ‘‘How
long ago did you first come to live in [country]?’’
Information about immigrant country of origin and
the recency of immigrant arrival were then
matched up with the polity scores from the Polity
IV data set http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.
Since recency of immigrant arrival is a categorical
variable that captures only approximate number of
years in host country, the variable was calculated
in the following way: if a survey was conducted
in 2002, then those who arrived more than 20 years
ago were assigned the average value of the 1972–
1981 polity score in their country of origin, those
who arrived 11–20 years ago the 1982–1991 score,
those who arrived 6–10 years ago the 1992–1996
score, those who arrived 1–5 years ago the 1997–
2001 score, and those who arrived within the last
year the 2002 score. We then calculated values
separately for respondents interviewed in 2003,
2004, etc. This resulting variable ranges from 0
‘least democratic regime’ to 20 ‘most democratic
regime’ (recoded from the original polity measure
that ranges from –10 to 10).
Foreign-born but EU citizen. Respondents were first
asked: ‘‘Were you born in [country]?’’ and ‘‘Are
you a citizen of [country]?’’ If a respondent said
‘No’ to both questions, then the follow up question
was ‘‘What citizenship do you hold?’’ If a respon-
dent reported being a citizen of a country that was
an EU member state at the time of the survey, then
the variable received a value of 1; otherwise 0.
Education. The highest level of education achieved;
ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating
a more advanced level of education achieved.
Income. ‘‘Which of the descriptions on this card
comes closest to how you feel about your house-
hold’s income nowadays?’’ 0 ‘very difficult on
present income’, 1 ‘difficult on present income’,
2 ‘coping on present income’, 3 ‘living comforta-
bly on present income’.
Manual skills. Following Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2007), coded using the ISCO88 classification: a
dichotomous variable, where 1 represents 1st and
2nd skill level (manual labor) and 0 represents
3rd and 4th skill level (skilled labor), in addition
to the fifth category of legislators, senior officials,
and managers assumed to be skilled.
Age. Number of years, calculated by subtracting
respondent’s year of birth from the year of
interview.
Male. 1 ‘male’, 0 ‘female’.
Married. 1 ‘married’, 0 ‘otherwise’.
Speaks host country’s official language at home.
Respondents were asked ‘‘What language or lan-
guages do you speak most often at home?’’ and
were given an opportunity to mention two lan-
guages. If at least one of the mentioned languages
is an official language of his or her host country (as
classified by the CIA), then the variable was given
a value of 1; 0 otherwise.
Multiculturalism policies. Immigrant multicultural-
ism policies from Banting and Kymlicka (2006).
The indicator captures the extent to which a coun-
try’s policies are designed to recognize and accom-
modate immigrants by taking into account 1)
constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affir-
mation of multiculturalism at the central and/or
regional and municipal levels; 2) the adoption of
multiculturalism in the school curriculum; 3) the
inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the
mandate of public media or media licensing; 4)
exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing leg-
islation, etc. (either by statute or by court cases); 5)
allowing dual citizenship; 6) the funding of ethnic
group organizations to support cultural activities;
7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-
tongue instruction; 8) affirmative action for disad-
vantaged immigrant groups. For each of these
items, a country received a score of 1.0 if it had
explicitly adopted and implemented the policy;
0.5 if it adopted the policy in an implicit, incom-
plete, or token manner; and 0 if it did not have the
policy. The resulting additive index ranges from 0
to 8, with higher values representing stronger mul-
ticulturalism policies in a country.
Political participation rights for immigrants. Source:
The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).
The measure captures the extent to which legally
resident foreign citizens have comparable opportu-
nities as nationals to participate in their host coun-
try’s political life by taking into account 1)
electoral rights (right to vote in national, regional,
and local elections; right to stand in local elec-
tions); 2) political liberties (right to association and
membership in political parties); 3) consultative
bodies (presence of strong and independent advi-
sory bodies composed of migrant representatives
or associations); and 4) implementation policies
(public funding and other types of government
support for immigrants at national, regional, or
local level). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with
higher values indicating more favorable environ-
ments for immigrant political participation.
Regional democracy satisfaction among natives.
Mean democracy satisfaction score among
native-born individuals whose both parents are
native born. Regions within countries identified
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using ESS region variables that were based on the
Nomenclature of the Statistical Territorial Units
(NUTS) (cf. Maxwell, 2013).
Regional pro-immigrant attitudes among natives.
Based on three survey questions: 1) ‘‘Would you
say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] econ-
omy that people come to live here from other
countries?’’ 2) ‘‘Would you say that [country’s]
cultural life is generally undermined or enriched
by people coming to live here from other coun-
tries? 3) ‘‘Is [country] made a worse or a better
place to live by people coming to live here from
other countries?’’ (Each item ranges from 0 ‘most
anti-immigrant attitude’ to 10 ‘most pro-immi-
grant’ attitude.) An average based on these three
items for each respondent was used to calculate the
regional mean (for each ESS round) among native-
born individuals whose both parents are native
born. Regions within countries identified using
ESS region variables that were based on the
Nomenclature of the Statistical Territorial Units
(NUTS) (cf. Maxwell, 2013).
Table A. Far-right parties used in the study.







Austria 1 Nov 2002 Feb 2003 10.0% 9.8% Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Austria 2 Nov 2002 Jan 2005 10.0% 9.8% Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Austria 3 Oct 2006 Jul 2007 11.0% 11.5% Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Austria 4 – – – – –
Austria 5 – – – – –








































Denmark 1 Nov 2001 Jan 2002 12.4% 12.6% Danish People’s Party (DF)
Denmark 2 Nov 2001 Oct 2004 12.4% 12.6% Danish People’s Party (DF)
Denmark 3 Feb 2005 Sep 2006 13.3% 13.7% Danish People’s Party (DF)
Denmark 4 Nov 2007 Sep 2008 13.9% 14.3% Danish People’s Party (DF)
Denmark 5 Nov 2007 Oct 2010 13.9% 14.3% Danish People’s Party (DF)
Finland 1 Mar 1999 Sep 2002 1.0% 0.5% True Finns (PS)
Finland 2 Mar 2003 Sep 2004 1.6% 1.5% True Finns (PS)
Finland 3 Mar 2003 Sep 2006 1.6% 1.5% True Finns (PS)
Finland 4 Mar 2007 Sep 2008 4.1% 2.5% True Finns (PS)
Finland 5 Mar 2007 Sep 2010 4.1% 2.5% True Finns (PS)







Republican National Movement (MNR)







Republican National Movement (MNR)







Republican National Movement (MNR)
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Table A. (continued)














Republican National Movement (MNR)







Republican National Movement (MNR)









National Democratic Party (NPD)
Law and Order Offensive Party









National Democratic Party (NPD)
Law and Order Offensive Party







National Democratic Party (NPD)







National Democratic Party (NPD)









German People’s Union (DVU)
National Democratic Party (NPD)
Greece 1 Apr 2000 Feb 2003 0% 0% –
Greece 2 Mar 2004 Jan 2005 2.2% 0% Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
Greece 3 – – – – –
Greece 4 Sep 2007 Jul 2009 3.8% 3.3% Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)






Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
Golden Dawn
Ireland 1 May 2002 Dec 2002 0% 0% –
Ireland 2 May 2002 Jan 2005 0% 0% –
Ireland 3 May 2002 Jan 2006 0% 0% –
Ireland 4 May 2007 Sep 2009 0.1% 0% Immigration Control Platform (ICP)
Ireland 5 Feb 2011 Aug 2011 0% 0% –
























Italy 3 – – – – –
Italy 4 – – – – –
Italy 5 – – – – –
Netherlands 1 May 2002 Sep 2002 17.0% 17.3% List Pim Fortuyn Party (LPF)
























Party for Freedom/Group Wilders
(PVV)
Fortuyn











Netherlands 5 Jun 2010 Sep 2010 15.5% 16.0% Freedom Party (PVV)
Norway 1 Sep 2001 Sep 2002 14.6% 15.8% Progress Party (FRP)
Norway 2 Sep 2001 Sep 2004 14.6% 15.8% Progress Party (FRP)
























Portugal 1 Mar 2002 Sep 2002 0.1% 0% National Renewal Party (PNR)
Portugal 2 Mar 2002 Oct 2004 0.1% 0% National Renewal Party (PNR)
Portugal 3 Feb 2005 Oct 2006 0.2% 0% National Renewal Party (PNR)
Portugal 4 Feb 2005 Oct 2008 0.2% 0% National Renewal Party (PNR)
Portugal 5 Sep 2009 Nov 2010 0.2% 0% National Renewal Party (PNR)
Spain 1 Mar 2000 Nov 2002 0% 0% –
Spain 2 Mar 2004 Apr 2004 0% 0% –
Spain 3 Mar 2004 Oct 2006 0% 0% –
Spain 4 Mar 2008 Sep 2008 0% 0% –
Spain 5 Mar 2008 Apr 2011 0% 0% –
Sweden 1 Sep 2002 Oct 2002 1.4% 0% Sweden Democrats (SD)
Sweden 2 Sep 2002 Sep 2004 1.4% 0% Sweden Democrats (SD)
Sweden 3 Sep 2006 Sep 2006 2.9% 0% Sweden Democrats (SD)
Sweden 4 Sep 2006 Sep 2008 2.9% 0% Sweden Democrats (SD)
Sweden 5 Sep 2010 Oct 2010 5.7% 5.7% Sweden Democrats (SD)








Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Freedom Party (FPS)
Swiss Democrats (SD)








Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Freedom Party (FPS)
Swiss Democrats (SD)








Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Freedom Party (FPS)
Swiss Democrats (SD)






Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Swiss Democrats (SD)






Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Swiss Democrats (SD)
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Notes
1. We use our key concept – satisfaction with the way democracy
works in one’s country of residence – interchangeably with
‘‘democracy satisfaction’’, ‘‘legitimacy beliefs’’, and ‘‘system sup-
port’’. Foreign-born individuals are sometimes referred to as ‘‘for-
eigners’’, ‘‘first-generation immigrants’’, or simply ‘‘immigrants’’.
2. Most existing research on far-right parties focuses on under-
standing the nature of their ideological appeals, organiza-
tional development, as well as the determinants of their
electoral breakthrough and persistence (e.g. Arzheimer,
2009; Betz, 1993; Carter, 2005; Gibson, 2002; Givens,
2005; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005;
Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005, ch5;
Mudde, 2000; Norris, 2005; van der Brug et al., 2005). Other
scholars examine how democracies responded to the rise of
the far-right by studying, for example, the behavior and pol-
icy positions of other parties (e.g. Alonso and Claro da Fon-
seca, 2012; Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Downs, 2012; van
Spanje, 2010), policy outcomes (e.g. Akkerman, 2012;
Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2012; Minken-
berg, 2001; Perlmutter, 2002; Schain, 2006, 2009), and the
attitudes of native populations (e.g. Dunn and Singh, 2011;
McLaren, 2012; Sprague-Jones, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2007; for
a useful literature overview, see also Mudde, 2013).
3. Consistent with these findings, Mudde (2007: 26) argues that
nativism – an ideology that combines nationalism and xeno-
phobia – constitutes one of the key ideological features of
radical right parties.
4. One exception is refugee policies that are decided at the level
of the EU.
5. Our argument focusing on far-right parties does not deny
that perceptions of threat among immigrants might stem
also from other sources, for example, mainstream parties that
have adopted anti-immigrant positions. However, given the
importance and degree of hostility towards immigrants
among far-right parties (that we document below), we believe
that their success in national elections is likely to play a par-
ticularly important role in shaping immigrants’ views about
the functioning of democracy in their host country.
6. Moreover, existing research suggests that there is a positive
relationship between instrumental and symbolic aspects of
citizenship: its instrumental advantages – that is, rights, pro-
tections, and entitlements that come with citizenship acquisi-
tion – enable immigrants to develop stronger affective ties to
their host society, as these advantages provide newcomers
with a long-term stake in their host country’s future (e.g.
Maxwell and Bleich, 2014; Reeskens and Wright, 2014).
7. In line with this perspective, several previous studies on Latino
immigrants in the US found that perceptions of linked fate or
attachment to their in-group are much stronger among foreign-
born individuals than among immigrants of later generations
(e.g. Barreto and Pedraza, 2009; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010).
8. The ESS data were collected using strict random sampling of
individuals aged 15 or older regardless of citizenship, nation-
ality, legal status, or language to ensure representativeness of
national populations. They have been shown to contain repre-
sentative samples of foreign-born populations as well (for
details, see Just and Anderson, 2012).
9. Looking at the data reveals that only 3.5% of foreign-born cit-
izens and 6.6% of foreign-born non-citizens gave a ‘‘don’t
know’’ response to this question, while the respective per-
centage among native-born citizens was 2.9%.
10. To ensure that our sample contains genuine immigrants,
foreign-born respondents with both native-born parents were
removed from the analyses.
11. For other studies using samples of foreign-born individuals
from the ESS data, see, for example, Just and Anderson
(2012, 2014, 2015), Maxwell (2010), Röder and Mühlau
(2012), Wright and Bloemraad (2012).
12. We have updated this list with information for the fifth round
of the ESS data and have added a few minor parties that fulfil
McLaren’s selection criteria but were previously overlooked,
Table A. (continued)







UK 1 Jun 2001 Sep 2002 0.2% 0% British National Party (BNP)
UK 2 Jun 2001 Sep 2004 0.2% 0% British National Party (BNP)






British National Party (BNP)
Veritas






British National Party (BNP)
Veritas
UK 5 May 2010 Aug 2011 1.9% 0% British National Party (BNP)
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most likely because of their small vote shares. Including these
parties in our data, however, does not change our main find-
ings and our inferences remain the same.
13. We considered using data also from the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (Klingemann et al., 2006) as well as the Demo-
cratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt, 2013)
as alternative sources for measuring party orientation towards
the issue of immigration. Unfortunately, the Comparative
Manifesto Project does not include any direct indicators of
party positions on immigration (the item that comes closest
is multiculturalism – a rather distant and imperfect proxy for
immigration); neither does it clearly distinguish between
positions and salience with respect to issues. Moreover, the
Comparative Manifesto Project includes only parties that
were able to secure at least two seats in the national parlia-
ment of their country, considerably reducing the number of
far-right parties in the dataset. Another data source – The
Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project dataset –
has the advantage of containing an item measuring party posi-
tions on immigration. However, data on this item are avail-
able only for three countries (Austria, Germany, and
Greece) due to the fact that immigration was treated as a
country-specific issue and data on this item was therefore not
collected in all countries included in the project. Hence,
Benoit and Laver’s (2006) data is the best source to test
whether the political parties we focus on are indeed more
anti-immigrant because it provides indicators with respect
to both salience and position on immigration, and also
because it includes information on a much larger number of
countries than other datasets.
14. Information is not available in Spain and Ireland because
there were no far-right parties in the relevant elections of
these countries; data on far-right parties is missing in Greece,
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK because these parties were not
included in Benoit and Laver’s (2006) data, most likely
because of their small vote shares and no legislative seats.
15. We operationalize natives as native-born individuals whose
parents are both native-born.
16. Since we have only five survey rounds in the ESS data, the
number of cases is insufficient to employ survey rounds as
a separate level of analysis. We therefore rely on country-
rounds as a macro-level unit of analysis, while at the same
time including ESS round fixed effects. Alternative specifica-
tions, such as using countries (instead of country-rounds) as a
macro-level unit of analysis or adding country dummy vari-
ables (instead of survey round dummies) to our models, does
not change our main findings appreciably and our inferences
remain the same.
17. Foreigners’ countries of origin were nested within host
country-rounds, but using crossed random intercepts pro-
duces nearly identical results.
18. Looking at the data reveals that the share of foreigners with
one foreign-born parent (in comparison to two foreign-born
parents) is quite small – only 9.97%. Moreover, 18% of these
individuals do not have citizenship of their host country. This
suggests that the primary route to citizenship among our
respondents is naturalization.
19. The results of additional robustness tests using all respon-
dents in the ESS sample (that is, both native- and foreign-
born) are consistent with our expectations. Moreover, esti-
mating our models on a more restricted sample of populist
radical right parties, as classified by Mudde (2007) (instead
of a broader group of far-right parties) generates nearly iden-
tical results.
20. Additionally controlling for political interest does not change
our main findings.
21. Excluding this variable from our models does not change our
main results.
22. Using alternative indicators, such as the Migrant Integration
Policy Index (MIPEX) (Niessen et al., 2007) or the Citizen-
ship Policy Index (CPI) (Howard, 2009) does not change our
main findings. Moreover, including an interaction term
between far-right party strength and multiculturalism or,
alternatively, between far-right party strength and naturaliza-
tion policies, produces statistically insignificant results with
respect to these interaction terms, while our main findings
remain the same.
23. Using immigrants’ electoral rights (instead of the more gen-
eral measure of immigrants’ political participation rights that
we employ in our analyses) produces nearly identical results.
24. While our models rely on regional (subnational) measures of
natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes and democracy satisfaction,
using country level measures or excluding these variables
from the models does not affect our findings appreciably and
our inferences remain the same.
25. We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous vari-
ables at their medians.
26. The results also show that in countries with no far-right par-
ties, foreign-born non-citizens are more satisfied with democ-
racy than foreign-born citizens, while the pattern is reversed
in countries with strong far-right parties. However, since
these differences are statistically insignificant, we do not
comment on them further.
27. As before, other variables are held at their means, and dichot-
omous variables at their medians.
28. The link between far-right party strength and democracy
satisfaction is negative and statistically significant also
among native-born individuals. While comparing natives and
foreign-born individuals is beyond the scope of our study, it
may be a fruitful venue for future research.
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